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COMMENT
THE ULTIMATE "ADVISOR": RIGHTS OF A
DOWNSTREAM STATE UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT
INTRODUCTION
The balancing of power in a federalist system presents interesting and
sometimes complex problems in the area of environmental regulation.
Pollution does not obey strict state boundaries and, as a result, can create
bitter interstate disputes. In State of Oklahoma v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency,' the Tenth Circuit, within the context of the Clean Water
Act,2 affirmed a strong role for "downstream" or "affected" states in the
permitting processes of "upstream" or "source" states. Addressing a
question of first impression in the Circuit Courts, the court held that when
a Clean Water Act discharge permit is issued in an upstream state, either
by the source state or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),3 the
Clean Water Act dictates that the discharge cannot have a "detectable"
impact on the water quality standards (WQS) of the downstream state or
states. Accordingly, the permitting entity must not only consider water
quality standards of downstream neighbors, but must ensure that upon
reaching the state line, the discharge in question meets all downstream
water quality standards.
Following a 1987 Supreme Court ruling that an affected state cannot
use its own nuisance law against a source state polluter,5 the Tenth Cir-
1. 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, I I l S.Ct. 1412 (1991).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
3. The Clean Water Act provides that EPA can delegate its permitting authority to a state provided
certain criteria are met. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. As of March 1990, 38 states and the Virgin Islands had
been delegated permitting authority under the Clean Water Act. Vol. I State Water Laws Envt'l
Rep. (BNA) 611 :0111. However, as discussed infra, state permitting authority is subject to EPA
oversight and veto authority. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. In Oklahoma v. EPA, EPA was the permitting
authority as at that time Arkansas had not yet received permitting authority pursuant to 1342(b).
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 598.
4. The court's decision was essentially a ratification of longstanding EPA interpretation and
implementation of the Clean Water Act. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 604. The court found it
"significant" that EPA's interpretation was "not one the agency adopted only, or in the first instance
in the context of this permit proceeding.... We accord deference to the consistent interpretation
of a statute by the agency entrusted with its administration." Id. See also, Champion International
Corporation v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390 (W.D.N.C. 1986), motion for withdrawal of mandate denied,
652 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D.N.C. 1987), vacated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 850 F.2d 182
(4th Cir. 1988) (see discussion infra at note 37). In Oklahoma v. EPA, the court did not find that
the Act was clear on its face as to this issue and accordingly examined the statute as a whole before
determining that the agency's interpretation was a reasonable one. 908 F.2d at 604.
5. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette et al., 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see also, Illinois v. Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) (Milwaukee III).
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cuit's decision is a welcome reprieve for affected states attempting to
clean their waters but thwarted by pollution floating downstream from
states where water quality standards may not be as stringent. Although
Congress may not have anticipated accomplishing the goals of the Clean
Water Act in exactly this manner, the court's decision greatly furthers
the goals of the Act to use water quality standards as an essential tool"
to produce a nation of fishable, swimmable waters and ultimately to
eliminate water pollution.' Further, the court was constrained by EPA's
interpretation of the Act. As the interpretation is a reasonable one, def-
erence must be given to the agency.' All courts reviewing the issue in
the future will be similarly constrained.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1985 the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas applied to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency for a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for a new municipal wastewater
treatment plant. Fayetteville applied for a split flow discharge; half of the
discharge would flow into the White River in Arkansas and the remainder
would be discharged into the Illinois River basin. The discharge would
be released into an unnamed stream and after flowing for fifteen miles
through two larger streams, empty into the Illinois River in Arkansas.
Twenty-four miles downstream from the discharge point, the Illinois
crosses the Arkansas-Oklahoma State Line and almost immediately flows
into Lake Frances. The Oklahoma portion of the Illinois and Lake Frances
are classified as an Oklahoma Scenic River and have been proposed for
study as a potential addition to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers
System.'
The State of Oklahoma and a non-profit group, Save the Illinois River,
requested denial of the permit and an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (AU) determined
the permit would not have an undue impact on water quality or violate
Oklahoma's water quality standards." This decision was appealed by
both Arkansas and Oklahoma. On appeal the decision was affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the ALJ concluded
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1312; 33 U.S.C. § 1313; EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Board, 426 U.S. 200,205, n.12 (1976) ("[w]ater quality standards are retained [in the amended
Act] as a supplementary basis for effluent limitations... so that numerous point sources, despite
individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality
from falling below acceptable levels").
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(1).(2).
8. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 598 (10th Cir. 1990).
10. Id. at 597.
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that the permit as written would not result in any measurable violations
of Oklahoma's water quality standards. The decision was upheld by EPA's
Chief Judicial Officer."
Both states appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Oklahoma challenged EPA's
issuance of the permit, disagreeing with EPA's conclusion that Oklaho-
ma's water quality standards would not be violated. Arkansas challenged
EPA's authority to require an upstream discharger (Arkansas) to comply
with the water quality standards of a downstream state (Oklahoma). The
Tenth Circuit held that the statutory language of the Clean Water Act,
the Act's legislative history, and EPA's implementing regulations man-
dated that "no discharge to a navigable water ... may be permitted
unless compliance with all applicable water quality requirements, in-
cluding the federally approved standards of affected downstream states,
is assured."' 2
BACKGROUND
The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act mandates that the discharge of any pollutant to
navigable waters is prohibited except as provided for in the Act. 3 The
stated goal of the Act is ultimately "zero-discharge" with an interim goal
of fishable, swimmable waters.' 4 A pollutant can only be discharged after
receipt of a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit.'- The primary basis for permits is technology-based effluent lim-
itations established at the federal level by EPA.'6
In addition to the rights and obligations of EPA, the Act provides states
with an important role in combatting pollution. Section 1251(b) of the
Act articulates Congress' intent to "protect the primary responsibilities
of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution. . . ." States
contribute to the regulatory framework by promulgating water quality
based standards. Section 1370 reserves the right to states to promulgate
standards which are more stringent than the requirements of the Act. State
promulgated standards become the "applicable" water quality standards
11. Id.
12. Id. it 615.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
14. "[lit is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated
by 1985." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1988); -[lt is the -national goal that wherever attainable, an
interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(aX2).
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1988); 1314(b) (1988).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
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for that state after EPA approval. " Accordingly, in conjunction with- any
federally promulgated water quality standards, state standards serve as
an essential supplement to federal effluent limitations in NPDES permits.'9
Although EPA is delegated primary authority to issue permits, it may
delegate its responsibility to individual states.70 However, even within
such states, EPA retains broad oversight authority.' Permits issued by
either EPA or the source state are "subject to the same terms, conditions
and requirements," ' and any issued permit must meet the applicable
requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318 and 1343. "23
EPA may object to a state issued permit on one of two grounds: (1) a
permitting state failed to accept the recommendations from an affected
state, or (2) the permit is inconsistent with the requirements of the Act.'
Prior to receiving full permitting authority, a state must meet numerous
criteria: two of these deal directly with the effect of discharges on down-
stream states. A state's permitting program must ensure that an affected
state receives notice of applications for permits and that there is an op-
portunity for public hearing prior to any final ruling.' Further, a state
permitting program must ensure that an affected state can submit written
recommendations to the source state concerning particular applications
for discharge, and if the written recommendations are not accepted, the
source state must notify the affected state and give reasons for the refusal. 26
When EPA is the permitting authority, section 134127 requires that a
permit application be accompanied by a "certification" from the state
where the discharge originates, stating that the discharge will comply
with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and
1317. Section 1341(a)(2) requires the certification to be relayed to the
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1988). Where technology based standards are inadequate to protect a
particular body of water, EPA is also authorized to promulgate water quality-based standards to
supplement technological limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a). EPA is also required to promulgate water
quality standards for a state if a state fails to do so or fails to issue standards which are acceptable
to EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(C). However, in practice, EPA promulgation of WQS occurs rarely,
if ever, and WQS remain primarily a province of the states.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c),(d) (1988).
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (1988).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1988). EPA regulations set forth additional grounds for objection.
See discussion infra at note 59 and accompanying text.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3) (1988).
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
27. Applications made to a "licensing or permitting agency" for a "federal license or permit"
are required to obtain certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1988). Under40 C.F.R. 121.1(b) (1990)
"licensing or permitting agency" means "any agency of the Federal Government to which application
is made for a license or permit." 40 C.F.R. 121.2(a)(3) requires that the certification contain a
"statement that there is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be conducted in a manner which
will not violate applicable water quality standards."
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EPA Administrator. The Administrator then notifies any state whose water
quality may be affected by the discharge, and a public hearing must be
held if requested by the affected state. Following a hearing, the agency
issuing the permit must condition such "permit in such manner as may
be necessary to insure compliance with applicable water quality require-
ments. If the imposition of conditions cannot ensure such compliance
such agency shall not issue such license or permit.""
Applicable Case Law
Long before the passage of comprehensive federal water pollution
control legislation, the Supreme Court recognized the interests of an
individual state in protecting the water within its boundaries." Due to
the interstate nature of such pollution disputes, the Court resorted to the
"federal common law of nuisance" to solve them. The notion of a federal
common law of nuisance survived until Congress passed the 1972 amend-
ments to the Clean Water Act, and the Court eliminated the use of federal
common law for resolution of interstate water pollution disputes by re-
versal of an earlier decision which expressly recognized the doctrine."
The Court based its decision on the "comprehensive" nature of the amend-
ments which clearly showed congressional intent to occupy the field of
water pollution control, thus eliminating the need for supplementation by
federal nuisance law.
On remand the Seventh Circuit was left to decide whether an affected
state could avail itself of state common law remedies despite the broad
reach of the amended Clean Water Act.' The Seventh Circuit held that
the Clean Water Act precludes application of one state's common or
statutory law to determine liability and afford a remedy for discharges
from another state."
In 1987 the Supreme Court was faced with the question before the
Seventh Circuit in Milwaukee 111. In Ouellette," the Court adopted much
of the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, ultimately framing the issue in
terms of choice of law: "when a court considers a state law claim con-
cerning interstate pollution that is subject to the Clean Water Act, the
court must apply the law of the State in which the point source is lo-
cated. "
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
29. See e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S.
365 (1923).
30. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee Il), reversing Illinois v
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee I).
31. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1984).
32. id.
33. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
34. Id. at 487.
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The question left open after the Milwaukee cases and Ouellette was,
what remedies, if any, were left to an affected state within the context of
the comprehensive regulatory framework of the Clean Water Act. In
Milwaukee 11 the Supreme Court based its refusal to allow application of
an affected state's nuisance law at least in part on the fact that under the
Act, "Congress provided ample opportunity for a State affected by de-
cisions of a neighboring State's permit-granting agency to seek redress." 35
The Court found that the application of a state's common law would
create confusing dual obligations given the Act's comprehensive nature.
However, in Ouellette the Court seemed to relegate the role of a down-
stream state to that of an "advisor" within the regulatory scheme of the
Clean Water Act.' The question before the court in Oklahoma v. EPA
was the nature and extent of this "advisory" role in the context of a
NPDES permitting proceeding. 37
ANALYSIS
The Oklahoma v. EPA court posed the primary issue rather simply:
"whose water quality standards take precedence under the Clean Water
Act-the upstream state's, the downstream state's, the federal govern-
ment's, or nobody's." 38 The answer is actually a hybrid: the court con-
cluded that the water quality standards of a downstream state prevail, if
35. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 326. citing to 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b); see also
Milwaukee II, 731 F.2d at 410.
36. Ouellete, 479 U.S. at 490.
37. As the Tenth Circuit notes, the role of an affected state under the CWA was briefly touched
upon in two previous circuit court opinions, Champion International Corporation v. EPA, 850 F.2d
182 (4th Cir. 1988); Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 602 n.6 (10th Cir. 1990). In Champion the court reviewed the
decision of the District Court, 648 F. Supp. 1390 (W.D.N.C. 1986), motion for withdrawal of
mandate denied, 652 F.Supp. 1398 (W.D.N.C. 1987), concerning EPA's objection to a North Carolina
permit on the basis that it would violate the water quality standard for color in Tennessee. Upholding
its earlier decision after reconsideration in light of Ouellene, the District Court found EPA's objection
to be reasonable. Although it found that the Supreme Court's decision did not mandate reversal of
its earlier conclusion, it stated that, "[nothing in the regulatory framework surrounding the CWA
would automatically require that a source state comply with the water quality standards of every
downstream state." 652 F.Supp. at 1400. However, the issue was never conclusively decided on
the merits because on appeal the Fourth Circuit subsequently vacated the judgment for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction since the EPA decision was not final. However, the Court of Appeals indicated
that it was in agreement with "much of the district court's opinion." 850 F.2d at 190.
In Montgomery Envt'l Coalition, the D.C. Circuit, citing to 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988), stated
in a footnote: "A state whose water quality will be affected by the issuance of a permit for discharge
in another state may block that permit until conditions are imposed insuring compliance with ap-
plicable water quality requirements of the objecting state" (emphasis added). However, the court
was not faced with this issue as no objection had been made to the proposed permit. 646 F.2d 568,
594 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
38. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 602.
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they are more stringent than the source state, as long as those standards
have been "federally approved" under the Clean Water Act. The effect
of the opinion, at least in the Tenth Circuit, is that in a permitting process
which is the subject of an interstate dispute, the state with the more
stringent "federally approved" water quality standards prevails.
The court's careful framing of the answer ratifies EPA's longstanding
interpretation of the Act and helps further congressional intent to use
water quality standards as an essential tool in the control and amelioration
of water pollution.39 Although it is not clear that Congress foresaw that
its purpose would be furthered by the application of one state's water
quality standards on sources in neighboring states, there is no legislative
history which contradicts that result.'
Taken alone, no single section of the CWA mandates the conclusion
drawn by the Tenth Circuit-that an upstream source must meet the WQS
of a downstream state when either EPA or the source state is the permitting
authority. But the court concluded that when the Act is considered as a
whole, and 1341 and 1342, primarily procedural sections, and 1311,
1312 and 1313, primarily substantive sections, are read as necessarily
interdependent parts, EPA's interpretation of the Act is supported by both
statutory language and legislative history. Accordingly, the opinion fo-
cuses on the meaning of section 1341, the "certification statute," 1342,
the permitting provision, and their interrelation with provisions estab-
lishing and implementing water quality standards. However, Arkansas
39. See supra note 6.
40. As. discussed infra the court's decision does not usurp a state's jurisdictional rights since it
is technically federal, not state law which is being applied, and the decision does not require that
a downstream state's water quality standards be met within an upstream state. There is some legislative
history which indicates a congressional concern to lessen the burden on industry by establishing an
"efficient and predictable permit system" with "clear and identifiable" standards. Ouellette, 479
U.S. at 496 (citing to S. Rep. No. 92-414, p.81 (1971) 2 Leg. Hist. 1499). However, Congress
also indicated that some costs to industry must be borne in order to to achieve the primary goal of
the Act to ameliorate pollution. See e.g., Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 870 F.2d
177, 252 (5th Cir. 1989); Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980);
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association, 449 U.S. 64, 79-83 (1980). The Tenth Circuit ac-
knowledges this interpretation. 908 F.2d at 633. Further, the Tenth Circuit's decision actually
distributes any burden on industry more fairly by forcing all dischargers along a particular waterway
to bear equally the cost of cleanup regardless of state lines. Indeed, EPA expresses that such a result
was a motiating force behind its interpretation of the Act. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 R2d at 606 n.
10.
Moreover, the Act suggests a congressional intent to use EPA to "encourage" states to work
together to eliminate pollution: "The Administrator shall encourage cooperative activities by the
States for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, encourage the enactment of
improved and, and so far as practicable, uniform State laws relating to the prevention, reduction,
and elimination of pollution .... 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988). The use of a downstream state's higher
water quality standards in permitting proceedings could be considered in some senses an example
of such "cooperation," although in this case "cooperation" is forced by the EPA.
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argued that these sections need not even be addressed as EPA's interpre-
tation was impermissible based on section 1370, the "savings clause." 4
What the "Savings Clause" Saves (or does not save) for States
Arkansas asserted that where a neighboring state implements stricter
standards than required by the Act, these standards could be imposed
only on that state's own dischargers. '2 Arkansas' argument was a good
one, based on age-old notions of the sacredness of a state's jurisdictional
rights. Clearly, if a source state is required, in effect, to "adopt" the
more stringent WQS of another state in instances where a discharge will
cross a state line, this could be interpreted as "impairing or affecting"
the "jurisdiction" of the State "with respect to the waters of such" state. "3
This appears to be what section 1370 prohibits.
However, the court interpreted the Act as merely requiring that the
discharge meet the downstream standards by the time it meets the state
line. The court did not find that a downstream's WQS had to be met
while the discharge was still within the confines of the source state; the
permit must be conditioned solely to prevent impact within the affected
state. Thus, technically, the "jurisdiction" of Arkansas over its state
waters is not usurped.
The court did not draw this conclusion explicitly instead it pointed to
three flaws in the State's argument. First, the court found that the leg-
islative history of the savings clause limits its applicability to the right
of states to set more restrictive standards." Second, the court found that
"waters of such state" was only applicable to subparagraph (2) of 1370
and thus, did not limit the right of other states to set more stringent WQS
which could subsequently "affect" other states. Further, the court indi-
cated that language in Ouellette helped support its interpretation: "[the]
41. Section 1370 along with section 1365 has traditionally been called the "savings clause."
Section 1370 provides "nothing in this chapter shall (I) preclude or deny the right of any State...
to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges or pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or
other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is
in effect under this chapter, such State ... may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or
other limitation... which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other limitation ... under
this chapter, or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of
the States with respect to the waters... of such States." 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
42. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 605.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
44. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 605. The court cites to S.Rep. No. 414, reprinted in 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, 3751. Although the Senate Report does state only that the
section "retains the right of any State ... to adopt ... effluent standards or limitations, or any
other requirement ... more stringent than those required... under this Act, "the report does not
specifically rule out the possibility that section 1370 can not also provide more. Legislative history
is not necessarily an exhaustive account of the possible meaning and application of each statutory
section. The language of the Report may, in fact, be neutral on the issue actually before the court.
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savings clause 'preserves the authority of a State,' but 'does not preclude
pre-emption' of state law."' 5 Finally, the court agreed with EPA that
consideration of section 131 l(b)(1)(c)t requires that an upstream state
comply with downstream WQS: "[in order to ensure that the EPA-
approved water quality standards in all states are 'met' or 'implemented,'
it is necessary to require dischargers to meet the applicable requirements
of other affected states."' 7 EPA asserted that since Congress made no
distinction in this provision between the water quality standards of source
and affected states, Congress indicated the uniform applicability of such
standards."
According to the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, the savings clause does
not "save" states the right to ignore the water quality standards of neigh-
bors. However, it clearly saves a state the right to implement more strin-
gent WQS and the right to ensure that these standards will be respected
by upstream sources. This interpretation furthers Congress' clear intent
to allow individual states to set more stringent standards. Without the
ability to require that out-of-state discharges meet these standards, the
right would be seriously impaired.
Section 1341
Arkansas argued that under 1341(a)(2), the "applicable water quality
standards" which a source state must "certify" a discharge complies
with, include only the WQS of the state where the discharge originates.' 9
The court rejected this interpretation based on what it saw as the "plain
language" of the provision. It found that "applicable water quality stan-
dards" must apply to both source and affected states since section 1341
is concerned specifically with "effects on states other than the source
45. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 605 quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette at 493.
However, the Ouellette Court's further explication of the savings clause may actually offer the
opposite result: "[the] language [of the clause] arguably limits the effect of the clause to discharges
flowing directly into a state's own waters, i.e. discharges from within the state." If section 1370
limits a state's power to "discharges from within the State" then it is difficult to see how a down-
stream's WQS could be required standards for a permit in an upstream state. Thus, it becomes
especially important to clarify that the only thing a downstream state can demand is that the discharge
meets its WQS at the state line.
46. Section 131 l(bXl)(c) provides that "[in order to carry out the objective of this chapter there
shall be achieved-) any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality
standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State law
or regulations (under authority preserved by section 1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or
regulation, or required to implement any applicable water quality standard established pursuant to
this chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(l)(c) (1988).
47. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 610 (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Section 1341(a)(2) providesin pertinent part "[w]henever 6uch a discharge may affect, as
determined by the Administrator, the quality of waters of any other State, the Administrator...
shall so notify such other State .. " 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1988).
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state. "' The court agreed with EPA's interpretation that the "purpose of
this provision" must be to enable affected states to ensure that their water
quality will not be jeopardized by a discharger in another state.5
EPA found support for its interpretation of section 1341 in Lake Erie
Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers.2 Lake Erie involved a discharger located in Ohio whose
discharge pipe was on the border of Ohio and Pennsylvania. Applying
what it saw to be the plain meaning of 1341(a)(1), the Lake Erie court
found that certification was required only from Ohio since that was where
the discharge technically "originated." In finding that only the source
state is required to certify, Lake Erie Alliance is in implicit agreement
with the Tenth Circuit's holding. EPA argued and the Tenth Circuit agreed
that in its certifying process a certifying state is required to consider both
its water quality standards and those of any affected state. Therefore,
certification by an affected state would be entirely redundant and unnec-
essary.
The result reached by the Oklahoma v. EPA court is a logical one. As
illustrated in Lake Erie, since an affected state may have a greater concern
over the impact of a discharge than the state of "origin," to both disallow
an affected state the right to certify and ignore its WQS in the state of
origin's certifying process would leave downstream states at the mercy
of decisionmakers in the upstream state. When upstream state dischargers
are located near state borders, considering the impact of the discharge
on neighboring states is especially crucial since this is where the discharge
can potentially work the most harm.
Section 1342 and its relation to 1341
The court's discussion of the permitting provision necessarily focuses
on subsection 1342(b)(5) which requires that a state must show that it
has procedures in place which ensure the input of affected states prior to
50. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 610.
51. Id. As the court notes, in 1977 Congress amended § 1341 to add § 1313 to the list of provisions
required for certification. The legislative history to the 1977 amendments makes it clear that NPDES
permits come within the ambit of § 1341 and that certification as to all applicable water quality
standards is essential: "[a] federally licensed or permitted activity, including a discharge permit
under section 402 [1342] must be certified to comply with State water quality standards adopted
under 303." S.Rep. No. 1370, 95th Cong. 1st. Sess. at 72 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4326, 4397. The court correctly points out that nowhere did Congress
distinguish between the water quality standards of source and affected states. 908 F.2d at 611.
52. 526 F.Supp. 1063, 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1981) aff'd without opinion, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983) ("[t]he purpose of the [1341(a) (2)] notice requirement is to
enable a state whose water qualities may be affected by the proposed federal activity an opportunity
to insure that its standards will be complied with.") (emphasis added) EPA also relied upon United
States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832, 833 (lst Cir. 1983) (certification is a
"condition precedent to the EPA's issuance of a NPDES permit").
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receiving permitting authority. 3 The court found that subsection 1342(b)
(5) "derives from" section 1341. The court did not elaborate on its
"derivative" conclusion, but implicitly indicated that since it found that
EPA is required to consider the WQS of an affected state when issuing
an NPDES permit under section 1341, delegation of permitting authority
to a state under subsection 1342(b) necessarily required the permitting
state to assume this obligation.' Arkansas argued that when the source
state is the permitting authority, any rights of an affected state are limited
to subsection 1342(b)(5) which provides only an advisory role. Thus,
allowing an affected state a greater role than it would have if EPA was
the permitting authority, would make "little sense." 55
The court responded by stressing that individual sections of the CWA
could not be read in isolation: "[sitanding alone [1 342(b)(5)] says nothing
about whether compliance with affected states' WQS is optional or oblig-
atory. " The court interpreted section 1342(b)(5) as "merely [describing)
part of the procedures a state permit program must provide for ensuring
communications among the source state, an affected state, and EPA con-
cerning the permitting of a new discharge in the source (permitting)
state."517 Further, the "fact that an affected state may have only an 'ad-
visory role' under 1342(b)(5) does not mean compliance with that state's
approved water quality standards is discretionary." ' When subsection
1342(b)(5) is read in the context of the whole Act, the court concluded
that compliance is not discretionary.5 9
The court agreed with EPA's position that whether the permitting au-
thority is a state or the agency, the permitting entity must consider and
ensure that a discharger meet the water quality standards of a downstream
state or states. The court stressed the importance of EPA's ability to veto
53. Section 1342(b) directs the Administrator to approve a state program "unless he determines
that adequate authority does not exist . .. [tlo insure that any State ... whose waters may be
affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written recommendations to the permitting State
... and, if any part of such written recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State, that
the permitting State will notify such affected State ... in writing of its failure to so accept such
recommendations together with its reasons for so doing." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
54. Applying a basic cannon of statutory construction the court could also be implying that the
more specific provision, 1341, takes precedence over the broader more general section, 1342(b).
Section 1342(b) only sets forth general requirements a state must meet prior to receiving permitting
authority. Accordingly, 1342(b) should not be read as an exhaustive description of what is required
once a state is delegated permitting authority. Since EPA does retain broad oversight authority, a
state does not have unfettered discretion concerning the rights of affected states even if its permit
program passed the threshold test of 1342(bX5). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5) (1988).
55. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 612.
56. Id. at 612.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The court did not explicitly point out that § 1342(b) (5) is merely a threshold requirement a
state must meet to receive permitting authority. Accordingly, the section can be read simply as a
threshold test, not an end in itself. See also supra note 54.
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a state permit under subsection 1342(d) for failure to accept recommen-
dations from an affected state for inadequate reasons. The court found
that in light of section 1342(a)(3), 6 ' it would be a nonsensical result if
EPA could veto a permit for failure to account for the WQS of another
state, yet itself issue a permit "objectionable on the same ground." 62
Finally, the court returned to EPA's primary argument; both subsections
1341(a) and 1342(a) require that whenever a certification is granted or a
permit is issued by either EPA or the source state, the Act mandates that
"all applicable requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317,
1318 and 1343" be complied with.63 Since section 1311 requires com-
pliance with "any more stringent limitation, including those necessary
to meet water quality standards" and the court accepted EPA's interpre-
tation that the water quality standards of section 1311 referred to both
source and affected states, the court found that "[tihere could be no
assurance of achieving a state's more stringent WQS if an upstream, out-
of-state discharger were not required to meet [a downstream state's]
standards. "64
60. The court seemed to imply that if a downstream state were limited to an "advisory role,"
inclusion of such a power would be nonsensical. If Congress did not think that the input of an
affected state was of highest importance it could have limited grounds for objection to the generic
language of "inconsistent with the Act,"
The regulations elaborate on this veto power "objection to the issuance of a proposed permit
must be based upon one or more of the following grounds .... [t~he written recommendations of
an affected State have not been accepted by the permitting State and the Regional Administrator
finds the reasons for rejecting the recommendations are inadequate." The regulation also provides
five additional grounds for EPA rejection of a state issued permit which include, "procedures followed
in connection with formulation of the proposed permit failed in a material respect to comply with
procedures required under the CWA.... Any finding made by the State Director in connection
with the proposed permit misinterprets CWA ...." 40 C.F.R. 123.44(c)(2)-(4) (1989).
61. EPA and States are "subject to the same terms, conditions, and requirements" when issuing
permits under 1342. 33 U.S.C. § 134 2(a)3) (1988).
62. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908,F.2d at 611.
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1988).
64. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 606. The court found that EPA's interpretation that the Act
mandates "strict compliance" with WQS of all states is supported by the legislative history of § 1311
("(EPA] is under a specific obligation to require that level of effluent control which is needed to
implement existing water quality standards without regard to the limits of practicability.") S. Rep.
No. 414, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, 3710. The court found it
particularly significant that when technology based requirements were "relaxed" in 1977 Congress
'left "no doubt that water quality standards must be maintained." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at
613.
The court also noted that EPA's "upset regulation" (40 C.F.R. 122.41(n)) requires water quality
standards to be met at all times, regardless of unavoidable upset conditions when technology based
effluent limitations may be waived. In its promulgation of the final rule EPA rejected a proposed
industry defense which would allow for violation of water quality based effluent limitations as long
as the actual quality of the receiving water did not fall below established water quality standards.
The court found EPA's reasoning for rejecting the defense significant; the agency asserted that in
order to use the defense "permittees would need to do continuous monitoring on all stream segments
that may be affected." The court stated, "[tihis view that all potentially affected stream segments
would have to be monitored reflects EPA's conviction that an upstream source whose effluent might
affect the water quality of downstream states must comply with the WQS of those states." Id. at
613.
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Reference back to subsection 134 1(a) and subsection 1342(a) is clearly
crucial to fully understanding the certification and permitting provisions.
On their own, sections 1341 and 1342 are primarily procedural provisions.
However, what really drives the Act are the sections setting forth re-
quirements for effluent limitations and water quality standards.65 It is only
through these substantive sections that the primary goal of the Act, the
control and amelioration of water pollution, can really be achieved. Ref-
erence back to the substantive sections clarifies that the water quality
standards of all states where a discharge will have an effect are "appli-
cable" and thus must be complied with when a permit is issued by any
entity pursuant to section 1342.
The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Sections 1341 and 1342
Arkansas asserted that the decisions in Ouellette and Milwaukee III
supported its interpretation of the statute. In Ouellette the Supreme Court
noted that subsections 1341(a)(2) and 1342(b) provide an affected state
notice and an opportunity to be heard when either a federal agency (1341)
or a source state (1342) is the permitting authority. However, the Court
went on to find that, "[elven though it may be harmed by the discharges,
an affected State only has an advisory role in regulating pollution that
originates beyond its borders.'
In Milwaukee 111, the Seventh Circuit recognized the importance of
sections 1341 and 1342 in protecting the "interests of a state whose waters
may be affected even though the discharges under consideration occur in
a different state." '67 The Seventh Circuit specifically noted that section
1251 explicitly recognizes "the primary responsibilities and rights of
states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution" and that section 1253
"encourages cooperative activities by the states and uniform state laws
relating to the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution."" The
Seventh Circuit interpreted the foregoing provisions within the "com-
prehensive" framework of the CWA as prohibiting application of state
common law on source states, but did not define the limit of an affected
state's rights within this context.
The Tenth Circuit correctly stressed that Ouellene and Milwaukee III
were procedurally distinct from the case before the court. Both cases
65. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1988).
66. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490.
67. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d at 412.
68. Id. at 411-12. The court also noted that § 1365(h) provides the governor of an affected state
the right to bring suit for the violation of that state's water quality standards as a result of an upstream
source and that 1319(a) (4) requires that when the Administrator issues a compliance order he must
send a copy to "other affected states" as well as the state in which the violation occurs. Id.
The Tenth Circuit considered the right of a governor to bring suit significant and found that it
supported its holding that source states must abide by affected states WQS: "Clearly the injury is
sustained by a state for which section 1365 provides a remedy is the impact on that state's water
quality, not the violation of the 'effluent limitation' per se." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 614.
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were enforcement actions where affected states or citizens of affected
states sought to influence discharges in another state after a permit had
been issued. In both cases the respective court noted the inappropriate
timing of plaintiffs' objections. In Milwaukee III the court stated, "Illinois
failed to participate in the permit issuing process when the Milwaukee
permits were issued .... That process seems now to be the appropriate
federal forum for adjusting the competing claims of states in the envi-
ronmental quality of interstate waters."' In Ouellette the Supreme Court
offered similar clarification, "respondents ... had the opportunity to
protect their interests before the fact by commenting and objecting to the
proposed standard.""0
The language in the Milwaukee cases and Ouellette clearly acknowl-
edges that an affected state does have "rights" and that the CWA provides
opportunities for these rights to be addressed. Although it is unclear what
the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court consider the extent of these
rights, an essential aspect of these rights is clearly timing. If an affected
state does not exercise its rights at the appropriate time as provided in
the Act, these rights are forever lost. In contrast to the states in Ouellette
and Milwaukee 111, Oklahoma intervened in the actual permitting pro-
ceedings of Arkansas, the upstream state.
Although the Tenth Circuit found the procedural dissimilarity sufficient
to dispose of any potentially contrary reasoning in Milwaukee III, the
court found the language in Ouellette slightly more "problematic." 7 '
However, with the procedural dissimilarity as a starting point the court
concluded that the language in Ouellette addressing the role of an affected
state was'dicta since the interpretation of the critical portions of the Clean
Water Act was not the issue before the Court.72 The Supreme Court was
concerned with a question of preemption of state law whereas the Tenth
Circuit was required to interpret the conflicting roles of states solely within
the federal arena of the Clean Water Act: "[the question before the
Ouellette Court was] expressed in terms of a state law claim concerning
interstate pollution and applying the law of an affected state. "" In con-
69. Milwaukee i!, 731 F.2d at 412-13 n. 5. In Milwaukee Ii, prior to remand to the Seventh
Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that "Congress provided ample opportunity for a state affected by
decisions of a neighboring state's permit-granting agency to seek redress." City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. at 326. The court indicated however, that the right to redress was subject to a
use it or lose it principle. The Court noted that Illinois received notice under 1342(b)(3) but failed
to participate in public hearings in any way. Illinois also failed to "avail themselves of rights under
1342(b)(5) and did not request an EPA veto of the permit under 1342(d)(A)." Id. As the Seventh
Circuit pointed out on remand, Illinois failed to take advantage of these "opportunities" and thus
was essentially estopped from asserting any objections after a permit had been issued. Milwaukee
III, 731 F.2d at 412-13 n. 5.
69. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498 n. 18.
71. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 607.
72. Id. at 608.
73. Id.
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trast, the case before the Tenth Circuit, as framed by the court, posed
the "question of the applicability of the federally approved water quality
standards of an affected downstream state in permitting a discharge in an
upstream state." 74 Accordingly, the Ouelleue language was not control-
ling in determination of the arguments presented by EPA and Arkansas.
How "federal" are state water quality standards?
The Tenth Circuit found that the water quality standards of a down-
stream state are "federal" law because they are promulgated pursuant to
the Clean Water Act and are federally approved" under the same." EPA
is directed to approve a state's water quality standards if they are "con-
sistent" with the Act. 6 The agency appears to be granted a fair amount
of discretion in determining the "consistency" of state standards." How-
ever, the EPA does not believe nor have courts held that the agency has
the power to disapprove of standards which are more stringent than re-
quired by the Act."' Accordingly, "approval" of state standards which
are more stringent than federal requirements is perhaps not much more
than window dressing. Therefore, more stringent water quality'standards
are perhaps, in reality, more creatures of state than federal law. However,
this federal stamp of approval is essential to effectively use those standards
for combatting out of state pollution.
Finally, even in cases where EPA may only give a superficial stamp
of approval, the agency serves as an important federal "buffer" between
potentially contentious states. Although states must be able to retain
jurisdictional power over their own waterways, in the context of envi-
ronmental control this must be subject to federal oversight. In Ouellete,
the Supreme Court saw the role of an affected state limited to an advisory
role in part because the "affected state's only recourse is to apply to the
EPA Administrator." However, this conclusion misses the point. Simply
because a state must use EPA as the federal go-between in an interstate
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. Technically a state could promulgate other water quality standards for application within its
jurisdictional boundaries. However, according to the Tenth Circuit and implicit in Ouellete, 479
U.S. 481, if a state wishes to protect its waters from out of state discharges it must seek federal
approval of those standards.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)(3)(B) (1988).
77. The grounds for EPA review of state water quality standards are as follows: state adopted
water uses must be consistent with the Act; the state must have adopted criteria that "protect the
designated water uses"; the state must have followed its legal procedures for revising or adopting
standards; if the state standards do not include the uses specified in 101(a) (2) of the Act the standards
must be based upon appropriate technical and scientific data. State standards must also meet the
requirements of 40 C.F.R. 131.6. 40 C.F.R. 131.5 (1989).
78. Some courts have held that "[d]eclaring state standards invalid because they are too stringent
violates both the statute itself and case law interpreting the statute." Homestake Mining v. EPA,
477 F. Supp. 1279,1283 (D.S.D. 1979); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822,835 (7th Cir.
1977).
79. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 490.
Fall 19911
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
dispute does not mean that it lacks real power to assert its rights as a
downstream state.' Indeed, the Tenth Circuit, while finding that a down-
stream's standards must be complied with, acknowledges the requirement
of federal moderation:
We do not suggest one state may directly regulate the conduct of a
discharger in another state. Such exercise of jurisdiction would ex-
ceed traditional bounds of sovereignty. Nor does the Act redefine
those bounds to allow dual permitting.... But the question posed
here is whetherfederal law embodied in the Clean Water Act requires
a discharge permit to ensure compliance with the applicable WQS
of all affected states."
The conclusion is correct--direct regulation of one state by another is
impermissible within the confines of a federalist system where the federal
government has sought to occupy the field. However, indirect regulation
is essentially the result of the court's opinion. According to the Tenth
Circuit, as long as an affected state has more stringent federally approved
WQS and jumps through the correct procedural hoops at the correct time,
an upstream state does essentially become "regulated" from down-
stream."2 However, the alternative, to allow an upstream state with less
stringent standards to "regulate" a downstream state, would be contrary
to the intent of Congress to use water quality standards as a supplement
to technology in efforts to ameliorate pollution. 3
80. In Champion International Corporation v. EPA, discussed supra note 37, the Fourth Circuit
read Ouelette as prohibiting Tennessee from imposing its standards on North Carolina but acknowl-
edged that "lilt may complain, however, to the EPA, as was done here." 850 F.2d at 184 n. 8. In
Milwaukee III the Seventh Circuit stated, "[ilf Illinois desires more stringent protection from out-
of-state discharges, it must turn in the first instance to the EPA and federal law for equitable
accommodation of its interests." Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 412-13 n. 5.
81. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 606 n.9.
82, However, even accepting this proposition, a downstream state must still prove that its water
quality is being "affected." Thus, a problem of statutory interpretation becomes an evidentiary
problem in an administrative hearing. As evidenced by the administrative hearings in the present
case, it may not always be so easy for a downstream state to prove an adverse effect even if it is
accepted that the permit conditions must ensure compliance with that state's standards. In the present
case, EPA found the discharge would have no effect on Oklahoma waters despite massive evidence
to the contrary. The Tenth Circuit reversed this finding. The court found that EPA misinterpreted
and misapplied "two important Oklahoma water quality regulations" and arbitrarily disregarded
certain expert testimony. 908 F.2d at 616. Further, the court found that EPA's decision to issue the
Fayettville permit was arbitrary and capricious in light of the fact that there was "substantial evidence
in the record of ongoing violations of Illinois River water quality standards .... " Id. at 615. The
court went on to hold that "where a proposed source would discharge effluents that would contribute
to conditions currently constituting a violation of applicable water quality standards, such proposed
source may not be permitted." Id. at 620.
83. The court explicitly acknowledged the possibility of this awkward result:
"The full ramifications of Arkansas's formulation. .. are exposed once it is realized
that an upstream state has the ability. .. to control the quality of certain of the waters
of a downstream state. It can accomplish this simply by setting and enforcing its own
water quality standards and releasing water of that quality to the downstream state. If
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Practical Effects of the Decision
As the court notes, by requiring states to abide by the "highest common
denominator" of WQS rather than the lowest, its decision aids in the
elimination of "pollution shopping," something the 1972 amendments
to the CWA were clearly designed to prevent." A discharger will lack
incentive to choose a state based upon the stringency of its water quality
standards."5 However, Arkansas raises a problematic aspect of the decision
when it hypothesizes that a "permit authorizing a discharge to the Mis-
sissippi River in Minnesota would be subject to nine WQS of downstream
states." In Ouellette the Supreme Court raised the same fearsome hy-
pothetical concerning the application of state nuisance law.
However, the Tenth Circuit distinguishes the Supreme Court's concern
in Ouellene by pointing out that unlike a situation involving the appli-
cation of state nuisance laws, the "standards" applicable to a discharge
are readily ascertainable because they are determined by EPA approval
of state WQS.' Further, the court found that as a "practical" matter "[a]t
some point downstream, the impact on water quality of a particular pol-
lution source becomes so attenuated as to be undetectable."8' With the
aid of computer modelling, a new source's potential impact could be
predicted as was done in the case of the Fayetteville pennit.88 Therefore,
even assuming that all nine downstream states had more stringent stan-
dards, it would not be likely that all nine would have to be met.
However, the "detectability" of the impact of a discharge with or
without computer modelling can be an evidentiary nightmare in an ad-
ministrative hearing, especially in light of the fact that using the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation, the determination could well be relevant for nu-
merous states. But such a cost may indeed be outweighed by the upgrade
in water quality which is inevitably the result of the requirement that
downstream water quality standards must be met. Applying the "highest
common denominator" will move the nation toward more uniformity by
requiring many states, at least near their borders, to implement higher
the upstream state's water quality standards are lower than those considered desirable
by the downstream state, so will be the actual quality of the interstate waters in the
downstream state. In other words, the lowest common denominator will prevail."
Id. at 602..
84. Id. at 606; See also S.Rep. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 73 reprinted in 1977 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4326, 4398.
85. However, if a discharger is located well within the borders of a state with lower WQS than
its neighbors, it probably would be alleviated of this concern as its discharge would most likely not
be "detectable" upon reaching the border.
86. The Supreme Court's concern in Ouellette was primarily with maintaining the clarity and
predictability of the permit system through "clear and identifiable" standards. International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496.
87. Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 607.
88. id.
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standards for dischargers. In enacting the 1972 amendments, the view
was that uniform standards could best combat water pollution.89 It is clear
that Congress intended this for technology based standards, not neces-
sarily water quality based standards which by their very nature tend to
be non-uniform.' ° However, a move toward uniformity in the area of
water quality based standards, in addition to uniform technology-based
limitations, would do much to upgrade water quality.9' Further, as EPA
acknowledges, the purpose behind its interpretation of the Act is to require
the burden of maintaining the quality of a particular waterway to be borne
equally by all dischargers along the river regardless of state boundaries.92
CONCLUSION
The court's position is appropriately broad. The court does not read
any section of the Act in isolation and in doing so better serves the
purpose of the Act to control and perhaps eventually eliminate water
pollution. The decision upholds a long tradition of recognition that the
ability of a state to protect its waters is important.93 However, the court's
decision clearly and correctly recognizes that this must be done within
the context of federal law. Faced with a dilemma of whether a source
state's lower or a downstream state's higher water quality standards should
prevail, the court chose the only alternative which could furtherthe goals
of the Clean Water Act. The "highest common denominator" must prevail
if congressional intent to ameliorate pollution is to be furthered. The
decision clearly recognizes congressional intent to use water quality stan-
dards as an essential tool in this process.
MARIA O'BRIEN
89. See e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
90. However, as noted in supra note 40, section 1253 of the Act provides that EPA "shall
encourage" states to cooperate to prevent pollution, possibly through implementation of "uniform"
laws. 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (1988).
91. The court implicitly acknowledged the applicability of the goal of uniformity to water quality
based standards: "If properly implemented [the provisions protecting downstream states] negate any
need for separate permits issued by source and affected states." Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d at 608.
92. Id. at 606 n.10.
93. See cases cited supra note 29.
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